MACHERY DOING WITHOUT CONCEPTS PDF
Doing without Concepts. Edouard Machery. Abstract. Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1 Thanks to Ted Sider and Ross Cameron for helpful comments and discussion. Doing Without Concepts. By Edouard Machery . Edouard Machery. Doing without Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press . pages. $ (cloth ISBN –0–19––0). The title is apt to.
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Machery provides an excellent review of major issues concetps the psychological literature on concepts and categorization and a very useful discussion of the contrasting goals of the philosophers who study concepts and the psychologists who do. More Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the macery of the budding neuropsychology of concepts.
Further, Machery’s discussion of machegy is among the best that I have seen. Evidence for the Existence of Exemplars 5. Woodfield – – Analysis 70 1: It’s not that Machery should have endorsed externalist strategies; my point is simply that he should have discussed them, particularly before giving up on the concept of concept entirely.
The notion of concept has encouraged psychologists to believe that a single theory of concepts could be developed, leading to useless theoretical controversies between the dominant paradigms of concepts. Three Fundamental Kinds of Concepts: How to Cut a Concept? After reviewing the psychological literature on concepts, Machery proposes that by “concept” psychologists usually mean something like this:. A concept of x is a body of knowledge about x that is stored in long-term memory and that conepts used by default in the processes underlying most, if not all, higher cognitive competencies when these processes result in judgments about x.
Prototypes, Exemplars, Conceprs 1. Indeed, it allows for the possibility — famously endorsed by Fodor and Chomsky, echoing Plato and Descartes — that many concepts may be innate: Externalism offers a straightforward suggestion: Doing Without Concepts, by Edouard Machery. mxchery
One Hundred Years of Psychology of Concepts: Edouard Machery – – Philosophical Studies 3: As a result of reading the book, I feel that I have a better grasp of what the reigning theories say, and of the experimental motivation for them. Concepts in Psychology 1.
Doing without Concepts – Paperback – Edouard Machery – Oxford University Press
In this way, Machery is quite right to claim that the psychological and philosophical work differ in at least their local concerns. The book is an excellent example of what interdisciplinary work by a philosopher can and should be.
I put “concepts” in scare quotes because, partly in view of Machery’s own claims and partly in view of some qualms I’ll raise, it’s not entirely clear just what he takes himself to be discussing. Sign in to use this feature. Mere similarity and overlap, however, are not identity, and it is identity in concepts that is needed to sustain serious explanations, such as ones about cognitive development, vision or language.
Certainly, much of the psychological work he reviews explicitly addresses the nature of “concepts”. Results in these areas have led many psychologists to reject what they regard as “the Classical View” that was inherited from traditional philosophy, according to which concepts have necessary and sufficient defining conditions known to competent users of them p.
The eight chapter makes his eliminativist argument:. This book argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to make sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology.
Gualtiero Piccinini – – Dialogue 50 1: Don’t have an concelts On the face of it, concepts are the stuff of which psychological claims and explanations are made.
Oxford Scholarship Online This book is available as part of Oxford Scholarship Online – view abstracts and keywords at book and chapter level. Academic Skip to main content. Against Hybrid Theories of Concepts. Andrew Woodfield – – Analysis 70 1: Request removal from conceepts.
The Heterogeneity Hypothesis 3. Doing without Concepts Edouard Machery. In order to claim that concepts don’t exist, doesn’t Machery need the concepts of “concept” and “exist”? No keywords specified fix it.
Civil War American History: This doesn’t entail that doihg aren’t the very natural kinds that determine what these different conceptions are aboutviz. As such, psychologists and philosophers are engaging in different projects when they talk about concepts, and Machery reviews some cases in which this has caused confusion.
Edouard Machery – – Oxford University Press. Hybrid Theories of Concepts Chapter 4. Edouard Machery – – Philosophical Studies 3: But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework. Something like the externalist strategies may be just the sort of thing for the purpose. In brief, concepts are not a natural kind.
The notion of concept has encouraged psychologists to believe that a single theory of concepts could be developed, leading to useless theoretical controversies between the dominant paradigms of concepts.